

still

was question ever asked:

What are all our assets for info  
on SVN?

How many "experts"? — <sup>who</sup>  
agents? <sup>when: gov  
qualification</sup>

SI

recon

analysts

VN-speakers

academic: consultants  
experts

researchers

State reporters, analysts

Is there a basis for comparing knowledge and info on  
one country vs. another?

## Research on Intell

1. Shadow-pricing system for intell

2. Program budget for intell

Cost data (e.g. "cost-price" of an NIE

[That would motivate score-keeping].

3. Value of info:  $\Delta$

conceptual analysis; study of past report...

4. Have to focus on intell arguments

(not educate intell analysts  
on decision problems?)

5. (Compare within on <sup>Value of</sup> Meteorological info)

6. Compare JCS to USIB in (1) style of commun

("authoritative pronouncements")

(("40's/50's style" still for USIB?)

(Note lack of <sup>any</sup> tie between Congress + JCS: so that  
Pres. can't appear to ignore "military judgment.")

7. Statements of JCS (past) users: <sup>questions of still com</sup> <sub>with limits on credibility,</sub>  
<sub>influence?</sub>

8. Analysis of past estimates: accuracy, clarity, timeliness,  
relevance, responsiveness, apparent report.

Look at disputes; Who was right?

Look at intel controversies; conflicts between intel and  
other, outside beliefs

## Intell

1. Decision/ORG model: supply model of relevant reality for decision-makers? what will happen if...

Transfer this from model of market to D.

Q. How complete is transfer?

2. OR: opinions, info, types, as data, evidence, for D.  
(a) How accurately does D perceive A's "output," views.  
(b) How influential is it? What relative impact

How influential should it be? An national interest?

Compare relative record.

has been

3. On UN, divergence of D from A is so great that one must question this transfer as goal of process.

What is the function of an NIE?

Of other intel ests?

4. Still, this is — or should be — any fraction of an NIE.

Clearly, a "communication failure"

and/or a "credibility gap"

(perhaps also an "attention gap")

and competing 'evidence' e.g. "common sense,"

national interests.

wishes, theories

## 5. - Ass - myth relations (e.g. security)

- lack of mutual exposure (common military: SA)
- lack of liaison (common military)
- Committee org. of intell [like JCIS]
  - "Protect authority" by omitting reasoning, evidence (or which, disagree, doubt by reader)
  - hiding disagreement
  - hiding record-keeping
  - suppressing uncertainty: <sup>sound, and</sup> differential
  - "compromises" - to get united front
  - ~~disagreement~~ - lack of face-to-face, or staff, interaction
  - awards-of-art not defined
- Desire to hedge, protect rep yet: lack of critical barrier (mild)
  - consensus
  - generalizations...
  - avoid post-mortems...
- heat problem (see 18)

6. Indicate comm., + hasil of:

- uncertainty; adequacy of info, expertise
- controversy
- means and prospects and costs of reducing uncertainty and controversy
- SA or SNE-type analysis, esp. (1) political, (2) <sup>involving 05</sup> stages

Belt: get away from util analysts telling to util analysts

7. Perceptions of D on their matters:

- does A know what they are?
- does A do anything about it?
- Is there a dialog?

[What is D response to a bad, values, est?  
to a wrong est?]

8. Fear of dialog — util getting into

Blocks to dialog

Value of info

Explicitness of model

Dialog

9. Leading to improved (a) presentation (more relevant output  
- better understanding of ""  
- better evaluation of output)

(b) collection, analysis,  
resolution of uncertainty.

Could cut down "arguents" by expressing  
uncertainty — e.g. "no one knows — nor frankly,  
convincingly,

Who is in intell com?

(Not SAC, Service, MACV still?) JCS  
("Wash and intell...")

J-2  
SA

- Who is perceived by D as in intell?
- Whose mistakes diminish credibility of "intell"?
- Whose agents create impression of "intell controversy"?
- Who forms a community? — mutual aims,

With what info<sup>test</sup> is "intell" produced by "Intell Com"?




— e.g., USIB — copy? Relative report?

(Typ: esp., output of SAC still, J-2, Service  
MACV obs, SA, IS...)

- Limitations of cables and estimates in educating new decision-makers?

- Interviews : e.g. out-of-office office (Clifford, Entwistle + intell user)
- Analysis of past estimates : language, content, "score"
- Formulate other types on blocks to credibility, communications
  - look at committee intell
- Models of intell process and function:
  - value of info
  - value experiments
  - statistical inference and practice of statisticians
- Study aspect relevance and import or merit of past intell outputs.

~~measured~~ Compare "rec pattern" to intell



# Decision Game

17 July 69

- Focus on decision process (650 - "adversarial technique")  
Note "realm" of past games w.r.t. process.
- Test hypotheses from:
  - Lessons from VN
  - MCN studies
  - Other crisis studies (Allison) (WSEG?)  
Kang, Berlin,
  - Org theory
  - Past game records
- Compare "blind" play to "modified, critiqued" play:  
Thus, expand critique session:
  - ask Why?
  - What are you thinking, etc.
- Then, play again: a play on  
Major replicate
- Structure: High-level authority; staff; intell; "field"; control  
(Enemy?) [Opposing bureaus? Competing staffs?]
- Relate to intell game: soon? Value of info.
- Aim at test of hypotheses; new hypotheses; experiment; ultimately, "teach" real authorities, change process.

Simple types:

- (a) RP, (does staff produce any option)  
Best Miserable Choice: May Work  
(no costs, prob., impact of failure, what then)
- (b) No checking of info, e.g. from field.
- (c) Inadequate alternatives: no complaint from NCA's.
- (d) Disputed views of NCA, staff, intell: effects.

[Why don't NCA's critique past "exercises";  
or study]


[Is objective to clarify aims, alternatives, etc. in  
substantive  
given area?

Or - to improve decision process, in general?

Or - to investigate it...

Only Theory <sup>hypo</sup>: (a) not based on Natural Security data  
(b) not tested

a a/a/a/a/



Korea:

Focus on crisis management

Why crisis? Because not anticipated.

Why not? Bad forward planning: can't be addressed in a game. Foreign policy people can't manage programs

One can force (in part) blowups of Cyprus,  
Arab-Israeli

Student: Get big people to construct a game, not to play it.

∠ ∠ ∠ ∠ ∠

Weiner  
Sternberg } org behavior  
Sternberg

AVW - Marshall: Build bumperster conflict into game. Have parties estimate each other's positions.

Ask for 0

Have a "staff" for each of several principals; have the fight for "this" proposal

[Treat NSSM-1 as a game?  

AVW: You can make known shortcomings vivid to decision-makers, so as to

- (A) change the personal styles
- or (B) win the support to institutional change in decision system

Intelligence

||

Rex Brown: Ph. Am Arbor, Bayesian Conf  
See '69

1. Tendency of decision theory/CR groups in industry:  
note "the problems they solve are not the problems  
management has"  
partly (a) incentives of staff are for intellectually  
sound & definitive solutions, not to produce  
relevant, implementable results.  
(b) the analyses take (problems have changed).
2. Experiments have shown that actual results are  
outside the "99% confidence interval" about  
40% of the time. I.e. if you are "certain"  
outcomes will lie between  $X$  and  $Y$ : take these  
roughly as quartiles rather than 99% limits.  
(better: quintiles).
3. In some companies, decision theory (decision tree)

e.g. Pillsbury

4. A prediction (on which a decision is based) becomes a target : a base for judging management.

An "expected" value by operator is a target he feels sure he can beat.

He is very reluctant to see a "median" expectation be recorded as expectation: if he is 50% likely to fall below that, he feels, being <sup>5 prob. of</sup> concerned.

5. Companies never take non-linear utility formally into account.

6. Companies prefer elaborate deterministic model using certainty-equivalents, than a simple model treating uncertainty explicitly; they believe advantage of complexity outweighs cost of pretending certainty (and they can Monte Carlo deterministic model on computer).

[ DE issues:

[VN]

1. Effect of operators' bias : and what companies do about it.

Brown: GE requires plant requests to be accompanied by prob. dist.

So companies do ask themselves what prob. dist. will "scrape by", and what inputs are required.

Checks:

retrospectively

(1) Negative incentives for bad estimates,  
[ at least: could compare predictions,  
e.g. by Intell and Operators.]

(2) Top management can make estimates of bias

[ Congress, on OOD requests: but OOD can foresee this + adapt.

- Body count.]

DE

1. VN. operators' ests and reporting  
vs. Intell (or "objective ests")

Hard

2. Is data used to change estimates?

Browns: Almost no example of prior/  
posterior analysis.

But there are examples of pre-posterior  
analysis, in deciding whether to undertake research or  
expirement.

Perhaps: (a) Operator has strong intuition after  
new info comes in; is willing to reject implications  
of prior and likelihood function.

(b) but has little intuition about the  
value of information.

3. Why is still est. ignored?
4. Note Nixon demand for "evidence."

jack glotnick, CIA: (going to ANSWER)

[1. How about using OT esp - core of intell. controversy: likelihood fns., etc.; proba; hypo;

[2. Examine track record.

[3. Examine failures, surprises: missile/bomb gaps, Cuba II, IRBM, Uprisings,

[Consider McCone vs. analysts in Cuba II.].

Analysts are able to make quick judgments in Bayesian form.

- Problem: Effect of uncertainty of information on the use of likelihood-ratios vs. absolute proba.

- Problem of updating likelihood ratios over time (consider non-stationarity of process).  
"We plot moving odds; if then shift, suspect non-stationarity."

[How about game-uncertainties: uncertainties of info based on contrary will generating info.]

Has DT affected expression/presentation of judgments?

DT still runs

- 5 - A Math Model for still Waring  
(Abba) Nov '67
- 5 - Ray's Theory - the Korean War  
mid-1968

Proctor